sirIn a scholarly and thought-provoking paper, Clarke sets out to debunk the concept of “rational suicide” as nonsensical.1 His motivation in this is to undermine any support that the notion of rational suicide might give to a “categorical right to suicide”. If his enterprise were successful, however, it would go far beyond the “rights issue” and would have a profound impact on all arguments raised in support of euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide.Clarke's major thrust might be termed the argument from posthumous (...) ignorance. He begins with a claim that the process of making a rational decision involves the process of “gaining all possible facts and `imagining' all possible consequences”. He goes on to say that making a rational decision “in the consideration of life or death . . . would seem to be impossible”. It is “impossible” …. (shrink)

A crisis continues to brew within the pharmaceutical research and development (R&D) enterprise: productivity continues declining as costs rise, despite ongoing, often dramatic scientific and technical advances. To reverse this trend, we offer various suggestions for both the expansion and broader adoption of modeling and simulation (M&S) methods. We suggest strategies and scenarios intended to enable new M&S use cases that directly engage R&D knowledge generation and build actionable mechanistic insight, thereby opening the door to enhanced productivity. What M&S requirements (...) must be satisfied to access and open the door, and begin reversing the productivity decline? Can current methods and tools fulfill the requirements, or are new methods necessary? We draw on the relevant, recent literature to provide and explore answers. In so doing, we identify essential, key roles for agent-based and other methods. We assemble a list of requirements necessary for M&S to meet the diverse needs distilled from a collection of research, review, and opinion articles. We argue that to realize its full potential, M&S should be actualized within a larger information technology framework—a dynamic knowledge repository—wherein models of various types execute, evolve, and increase in accuracy over time. We offer some details of the issues that must be addressed for such a repository to accrue the capabilities needed to reverse the productivity decline. (shrink)

Using a longitudinal case study design, we have tracked the recovery of motor function following severe traumatic brain injury (TBI) through a multimodal neuroimaging approach. In 2006, Canadian Soldier Captain (retired) Trevor Greene (TG) was attacked with an axe to the head while on tour in Afghanistan. TG continues intensive daily rehabilitation, which recently included the integration of physical therapy (PT) with neuromodulation using translingual neurostimulation (TLNS) to facilitate neuroplasticity. Recent findings with PT+TLNS demonstrated that recovery of motor function occurred (...) beyond conventional time limits, currently extending past 14-years post-injury. To investigate whether PT+TLNS similarly resulted in associated cognitive function improvements, we examined event-related potentials (ERPs) with the brain vital signs framework. In parallel with motor function improvements, brain vital signs detected significant increases in basic attention (as measured by P300 response amplitude) and cognitive processing (as measured by contextual N400 response amplitude). These objective cognitive improvements corresponded with TG’s self-reported improvements, including a noteworthy and consistent reduction in ongoing symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The findings provide valuable insight into the potential importance of non-invasive neuromodulation in cognitive rehabilitation, in addition to initial indications for physical rehabilitation. (shrink)

Progressive supranuclear palsy is a movement disorder with prominent tau neuropathology. Brain diseases with abnormal tau deposits are called tauopathies, the most common of which is Alzheimer's disease. Environmental causes of tauopathies include repetitive head trauma associated with some sports. To identify common genetic variation contributing to risk for tauopathies, we carried out a genome-wide association study of 1,114 individuals with PSP and 3,247 controls followed by a second stage in which we genotyped 1,051 cases and 3,560 controls for the (...) stage 1 SNPs that yielded P ≤ 10-3. We found significant previously unidentified signals associated with PSP risk at STX6, EIF2AK3 and MOBP. We confirmed two independent variants in MAPT affecting risk for PSP, one of which influences MAPT brain expression. The genes implicated encode proteins for vesicle-membrane fusion at the Golgi-endosomal interface, for the endoplasmic reticulum unfolded protein response and for a myelin structural component. © 2011 Nature America, Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)

In the last decade the use of advance directives or living wills has become increasingly common. This paper is concerned with those advance directives in which the user opts for withdrawal of active treatment in a future situation where he or she is incompetent to consent to conservative management but where that incompetence is potentially reversible. This type of directive assumes that the individual is able accurately to determine the type of treatment he or she would have adopted had he (...) or she been competent in this future scenario. The paper argues that this assumption is flawed and provides theoretical and empirical evidence for this. If the assumption is false, and those taking out advance directives do not realise this, then the ethical bases for the use of these advance directives-the maximisation of the individual's autonomy and minimisation of harm-are undermined. The paper concludes that this form of advance directive should be abolished. (shrink)

Body integrity identity disorder is a very rare condition in which people experience long-standing anguish because there is a mismatch between their bodies and their internal image of how their bodies should be. Most typically, these people are deeply distressed by the presence of what they openly acknowledge as a perfectly normal leg. Some with the condition request that their limb be amputated. 1 We and others have argued that such requests should be acceded to in carefully selected patients.1–4 Consistent (...) with this view, a group at the University of Sydney is developing a programme to better understand and treat BIID and to offer amputation if appropriate. In a recent paper, Patrone argues that such amputations should be prohibited.5 He suggests that authors supporting amputation in BIID depend on analogies with more familiar conditions and then claim that the ‘the desires, choices and requests of BIID patients should be held to exactly the same standards and treated with exactly the same respect as the desires, choices and requests of any more conventional patient’.5 He believes that these analogies are invalid and that therefore the arguments for amputation are invalid.Patrone concentrates a great deal upon whether a decision to have a particular medical intervention is to be regarded as ‘rational’. Unfortunately, he makes no attempt to define what he …. (shrink)

Is there ever any reason for a doctor to lie to a patient? In this paper, we critically review the literature on lying to patients and challenge the common notion that while lying is unacceptable, a related entity--'benevolent deception' is defensible. Further, we outline a rare circumstance when treating psychotic patients where lying to the patient is justified. This circumstance is illustrated by a clinical vignette.

The importance of this book, which appeared in the original German in 1969 under the title Zur Sache des Denkens, 743), is attested to by the rapidity with which it has been translated into English. The title of the English translation is that of the lead essay, the highly celebrated lecture which Heidegger gave in 1962 and which bears the same title as the never published "third division" of the "first half" of Being and Time. This lecture is perhaps the (...) most significant document to be added to the Heideggerian corpus since the Letter on Humanism. It is of course dramatically different from Being and Time and so cannot be regarded as a "continuation of the text of Being and Time." "Time and Being" thematizes the central notion of Heidegger’s later work, "Das Eregignis," [[sic]] translated happily by Miss Stambaugh as "Event of Appropriation". The "Event of Appropriation" is the "It" which "gives" Being and time in the sequence of epochs which constitute the history of Western metaphysics. The lecture is followed by an instructive "seminar" conducted by Heidegger on the text of "Time and Being." There is found here also a penetrating essay entitled "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking," as well as a fascinating piece of autobiography entitled "My Way in Phenomenology." Miss Stambaugh’s translation is superb, something readers of the "Heidegger, Works" series which she edits with J. Glenn Garay have become accustomed to.—J. D. C. (shrink)

This volume, dedicated to Rudolph Bultmann, contains the text of a lecture held in 1927 and that of a letter addressed to the participants in a colloquium held at Drew University in 1964. Separated by thirty-seven years and the workings of the "turn" in Heidegger's thought, the texts are profoundly different. In "Phenomenology and Theology", seeking to delineate the notion of Theology as a science, Heidegger says that Theology is a "positive" science in the somewhat Wolffian sense that its subject (...) matter is a "posit," an "existent" being: God. Christian theology is centered on the positing of Christ and concerns "Christianliness", which is the existentiell posture of belief in the "Crucifixion." As such, Christian Theology concerns a specific "Way of Being" and to this extent is subordinate to Philosophy, which deals with the more radical realm of Being itself. Theology seeks to explicate "believing existence" but Philosophy provides the categories with which Existenz itself is to be understood. Philosophy is ontological-existential; Theology is ontico-existentiell. The whole discussion is determined by the terms of Being and Time, § 3. The second text, "The Problem of a Non-Objectifying Thought and Language in Contemporary Theology," holds out to Theology the ideal of a thinking which is neither ontic nor ontological, neither existentiell nor existential, but altogether beyond the realm of concepts. Once again Theology is directed to follow the lead of a more radical undertaking now no longer called Philosophy but simply Thought.--J. D. C. (shrink)

A clear restatement of the essentials of the Maritain approach to Christian Wisdom, the work is concerned with the nature and hierarchy of the kinds of knowledge. This hierarchizing is accomplished from that standpoint of the philosophizing Christian in which the scientific is subordinated to the philosophic and especially the metaphysical, and in which the human is subordinate to the theological and especially mystical. In such a world view the ultimate value term is the contemplative, and the possibility and actuality (...) of a "Christian Humanism" is affirmed through a relating of natural human knowledge and divine contemplation. The Christian philosopher is a finite intelligence confronting "Being" which is ultimately trans-conceptualizable and so mysterious; but God is Being Itself and so the finite intelligence tends toward God by a native and internal dynamism. The author is not concerned with the esthetico-epistemological reflections of Maritain but does carefully analyze knowledge through affective connaturality. He also attempts to develop a closer relation between a metaphysical "philosophy of nature" and modern science, construed as a mathematical interpretation and organization of phenomena, in his concept of "integrated knowledge of nature." Unfortunately there is a striking disaffection for dissenting philosophical views. In defending Thomism against its critics the author not only says that the critics do not understand it, but he also suggests that this is because its opponents, when they are sceptics and agnostics, lack Grace and so are deprived of a purely natural intellectual strength which accompanies its presence and are therefore intellectually defective. Such narrowness is offensive, not necessary to the author's thesis, and seems opposed to the spirit of Aquinas himself.—J. D. C. (shrink)

M. Palmier has made a valuable contribution to one of the most controversial issues in contemporary philosophy: the problem of Heidegger and the Nazis. Palmier does not side-step the issue by writing off the political works of 1933-1934 as a regrettable "mistake." "These writings belong to the work of Heidegger as the theological works at Tübingen belong to that of Hegel". He analyzes what is known of Heidegger's early life in a somewhat sketchy way, omitting, e.g., any mention of Karl (...) Braig. After discussing Brentano, Rickert, Lask, and Dilthey, he studies Heidegger's relationship with Cassirer and clears up most convincingly the charge of anti-Semitism levelled against Heidegger in 1950 by Cassirer's wife. This is followed by an equally persuasive and sympathetic account of Heidegger and Husserl. The heart of the book, however, is an analysis of the remark made in 1935 in which Heidegger refers to the "inner truth and grandeur" of the Nazi movement which became so notorious when Heidegger allowed it to appear unchanged in the 1953 edition of those lectures under the title An Introduction to Metaphysics. The grandeur Heidegger has in mind is the confrontation of modern man and planetary technology. This phrase must be understood, Palmier argues, in connection with a book by Ernst Jünger which appeared in 1932 entitled Der Arbeiter. The analysis the author offers is most illuminating. Palmier's interpretation is happily reenforced by an appendix which consists in a selection of texts from Ernst Krieck, an official Party philosopher, in which Heidegger is violently attacked--thus making the distance which Heidegger had put between himself and the Nazis abundantly clear, and effectively counterbalancing Schneeberger's one-sided documentation in Nachlese zu Heidegger.--J. D. C. (shrink)

Rene Le Senne belongs to the classical tradition of French philosophy. Unlike Sartre and Merleau-Ponty who owe so much to German sources Le Senne draws his philosophical sustenance primarily from the French tradition of Descartes, Octave Hamelin, Maine de Biran, and Bergson. His thought is the primary form of "Neo-Cartesianism" in contemporary philosophy. He is most well known for the alliance he formed in 1934 with Louis Lavelle and which is known as the Philosophie de l'Esprit movement. This movement subscribes (...) to two principles: the primacy of the Cartesian experience of the thinking self, and the discoverability of God in the experience of the self. Obstacle and Value, Le Senne’s major work, was published in 1934. In this work he develops a concept of the "I" as the "unity of experience," the matrix of all particular experiences, of both ideal cognitions and concrete existential encounters. This "ideo-existential" complex is what he calls "spirit." Spirit develops in an opposition or tension with "obstacles" which resist it. Spirit overcomes these obstacles by subverting them to its own goals, thereby endowing them with "value." The experience of obstacles gives rise to the hope of an absolute value. The spirit and God exist in a reciprocal relationship. God is never something wholly other to the self; and the self is in its inner being divinized by its relationship to God. There is then a double cogito: the cogito as man and the cogito as God. All experience is dominated by this reciprocal relationship between the self and God. The concluding chapters of the book explain how man can have the experience of being independent of God, without God. There is a helpful introduction by translator Dauenhauer, a brief bibliography, and no index of any kind.—J.D.C. (shrink)

As Gelven points out in his Preface, this is the only section-by-section commentary on the full text of Being and Time. Being and Time is divided not only into two "divisions" of six chapters each but also into eighty-three numbered "sections". As such it provides an efficient and useful handbook for those who try to make their way through the rugged terrain of Heidegger's text, especially for the beginner. Gelven's prose is crisp and clean and uncluttered by Germanicisms. He often (...) uses uncomplicated and helpful illustrations. The interpretation stresses the importance of the analysis of "understanding" taking § 31 as "the key to Being and Time". In fact, Gelven groups §§ 25-38 as a whole under the single heading "Understanding". Such an emphasis seems entirely legitimate. He treats the historical sources of Being and Time but often leaves them undeveloped. He is content, for example, to devote a single paragraph to Dilthey whose influence upon Heidegger is so decisive, with the comment that not much is ever said about Dilthey in English philosophical literature. One also finds it a bit hard to swallow the author's argument that "Dasein" means literally "to be here" and, in sentence form: "Here I am, open to possibilities". In all, however, Gelven's work is a distinctive contribution and not a mere reworking of already familiar themes.--J. D. C. (shrink)

One can only look with favor upon the appearance of the English translation of this tremendously important work in the history of ethical theory in twentieth century European philosophy. We are also fortunate to have in Manfred Frings both the general editor of the German edition of the collected works of Scheler and a skillful translator of this significant work. In this work, Scheler hopes to mediate between Kant’s empty formalism and ethical relativism by developing an absolutistic ethics which nonetheless (...) does not focus on mere "duty" but on a definite moral "content". In the absence of an adjectival form for "content," Frings and Funk have decided to translate "die materiale Wertethik" by "non-formal ethics of values." Such an ethics centers on the absolute value of persons; thus the subtitle of the work: "A New Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism." Scheler’s method in this work is, as is well known, "phenomenological," i.e., concerned with intuiting the essence or absolute being of ethical values. There is a helpful bibliography, an index of names, and a detailed index of subjects.—J.D.C. (shrink)

This work is an invaluable aid to Heidegger scholars. It brings the bibliography of Heidegger to completion through 1967. The work begins with a presentation of the writings of Heidegger in chronological order. Next the author lists all the translations of Heidegger's works, following the order in which those works were presented in the previous section. It is interesting to note that there are no less than four translations of Sein und Zeit in Japanese. The literature on Heidegger comes next. (...) It is presented year by year, with the authors within a single year listed alphabetically. This section includes both books and articles. A spot check reveals inevitable omissions and mistakes. No entry occurs for the partial translation of Vom Wesen des Grundes in The Search for Being, trans. and ed. by J. Wilde and W. Kimmel, pp. 507-520. The fascinating fact that Gilbert Ryle reviewed Sein und Zeit in Mind, 38, pp. 355-370) is obscured by referring to "Ryle, E." in both the entry and the index. This is unfortunate because of the many favorable things that Ryle has to say about Heidegger in this review. None of the good articles and translations of originally foreign articles into English on Heidegger that appear in Philosophy Today are to be found. Helene Weiss' "The Greek Conception of Time and Being in the Light of Heidegger's Philosophy," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, II, pp. 173-187 does not appear, although an article on Heidegger in the previous issue of the same journal does. There is no index of topics but only of authors. Building on H. Lübbe's twelve-year old bibliography this work is of great service to Heideggerians.--J. D. C. (shrink)

With the publication of this translation the quality of Heidegger literature available in English takes a quantum leap forward. No book--save perhaps Otto Poeggeler's--can match Marx's for its depth of insight into Heidegger's thought. The central theme of the book is as follows. Hegel's claim to have consummated the Western "tradition" is accepted by Heidegger. The foundations of this tradition are in Greek ontology. Marx locates the classic formulation of the basic tenets of Greek ontology in the Aristotelian doctrine of (...) ousia. Being as ousia is the perduring, necessary and intelligible. The Hegelian idea of Being remains within the Aristotelian perspective because it determines Being as the unfolding of the self-same substance according to necessary law and so as to develop into a stage of maximum intelligibility. Being is more radically temporal, of course, for Hegel but this stays within the perspective of the Greek notion of eternity, because the Hegelian "substance" is relentlessly working out an eternal pattern of categories which is inscribed in its very essence, and which the Logic articulates. Heidegger's philosophy seeks to "overcome" the "tradition," and so the whole metaphysics of "substance and subject." Being is even more radically temporalized, for Heidegger does not think time on the "model" of eternity. Being as time is not the movement of the self-same through time but time itself--as Being. The necessity and lawfulness of Being, moreover, is replaced by the "play" of the "fourfold." And the radical intelligibility of Being is overcome in Heidegger's thought by the interplay of concealment and unconcealment. Finally, against the Aristotelian-Hegelian teleology Heidegger posits the hope of a "new beginning" of history whose coming to pass--by a "turn" on Being's part--can only be obscurely intimated and at best "awaited." Not the least among this book's merits is the refreshingly critical attitude of the author to Heidegger--the book he says was prompted by a reflection on Heidegger-critic Lowith's [[sic]] work on Heidegger. His criticism of Heidegger in the conclusion of this book sets out important objections which the usual commentator ignores or evades or attributes to a "fallenness" into "calculative" thinking.--J. D. C. (shrink)

With the exception of three articles, all of the pieces collected here by Ballard and Scott appeared in the Winter, 1970 issue of The Southern Journal of Philosophy commemorating Heidegger’s 80th birthday. The opening essay by Poeggeler, "Heidegger Today," masterfully reviews the state of Heideggerian scholarship, sketching the direction which Heidegger’s interpretations have taken, and outlining his own unitary view of Heidegger’s development. This is followed by an interesting essay from the Heidegger critic Karl Löwith who, after some revealing personal (...) recollections about Heidegger, takes up the question of the relationship of Dasein, which stands out from and transcends nature, with the natural world, a question Heidegger himself omits. There is also a close exposition by Joseph Kockelmans of the all-important "Time and Being" lecture of 1962 and of its relationship to Being and Time. Hans-Georg Gadamer contributes a philosophical essay—not a piece of Heideggerian scholarship—on the nature of "empty" time, i.e., the temporal project which we hope to "fill up," and of the "transition" into fulfillment. Editor Scott gives an account of Dasein in Being and Time by an analogy with Leibniz’s monad as a self-originating, purposeful unit of activity. Theodore Kisiel differentiates the mathematical a priori, described by Heidegger as the root conception of modern science, from Heidegger’s own "hermeneutical" a priori. There are three studies of language: Volmann-Schluck discusses language and myth, while John Sallis studies how language and the reversal are intertwined in Heidegger’s thinking; Don Ihde differentiates "existential" phenomenology as a phenomenology of perception from "hermeneutic" phenomenology as a phenomenology of meaning, signification, and language. In addition to essays by A. V. Schoenborn, F. J. Smith, and Edward Ballard, there is also a concluding contribution by Jean Beaufret who offers a portrait of Heidegger "as seen from France."—J.D.C. (shrink)

Mohanty’s work is a collection of essays whose range of interest is quite astounding: phenomenology, analytic philosophy and Indian thought. Part One is concerned with the problem of the given, a problem of great interest to both analytic and phenomenological philosophy, and argues against a theory of raw, uninterpreted sense data. The title of the book is drawn from one of the essays contained in this part, which makes a plea for a non-speculative, descriptive ontology of the given. Part Two (...) offers a series of critical essays on the work of Quine, Goodman, Ryle and Moore on the one hand, and Husserl and Hartmann on the other. The last part is devoted to a study of the Indian "Nyaya" philosophy, and shows its relevance to the epistemological issues that Mohanty has raised throughout this volume. Perhaps the major interest of this book is the striking unity the author finds among these diverse philosophical strains.—J. D. C. (shrink)

This is the second of a planned 5-volume translation of the most significant entries in Kierkegaard’s Papirer, which in the Danish edition consumes 20 volumes. The translation is done by Howard and Edna Hong, translators of the Philosophical Fragments and other works of Kierkegaard, and the winners of the National Book Award for Translation in 1967 for their translation of Volume I of the Journals. Volumes I through IV are arranged according to topics in alphabetical order, and within each topic (...) the entries appear in chronological order. Volume V will be devoted to autobiographical material. Some of the more significant themes covered in Volume II include faith, freedom, God, grace, Hegel, history, humor and irony, the individual, and knowledge. Each entry is numbered consecutively and then its source in the Danish edition and date are given. There is a collation of entries in the English edition with the Danish Papirer, and over 60 pages of notes by the translators. The journals of any philosopher are an important aid in understanding his thought, but in the case of Kierkegaard they are especially significant because of the indirect, pseudonymous and ironical character of Kierkegaard’s writings. We are fortunate to have this highly professional translation of these important texts at our disposal to assist us in the difficult work of interpreting Kierkegaard.—J.D.C. (shrink)

"Neuroscience and Philosophy" begins with an excerpt from "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience," in which Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker question the ...

John Sallis of Duquesne University has edited this fine collection of essays on Heidegger as a tribute to the latter on the occasion of his eightieth birthday. Some of the contributions are papers that were read at a Heidegger Symposium at Duquesne in October, 1966. There is a brief letter by Heidegger addressed to Arthur Schrynemakers, chairman of the Symposium, in which Heidegger submits a set of questions for the consideration of the Symposium participants. Sallis contributes an article which responds (...) to these questions. Zygmunt Adamczewski's contribution is a commentary and elaboration of some issues, e.g., the translation of Wesen, which he discussed personally with Heidegger in 1968. Edward Ballard gives a very clear-headed account of Heidegger's critique of science. There is an excellent account of the "Ereignis" by Theodore Kisiel and of "Time and Being" by André Schuwer. Other contributors include C. D. Keyes, Thomas Langan, Ralph Powell, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka and John Wild. The volume is lacking in two respects. Except for a brief piece by Langan and for certain implications of Powell's study, there is no really sustained and well-developed critique of Heidegger either internal or external, sympathetic or unsympathetic, a failure not uncommon among Heideggerians. Moreover, there is no index of any kind--of topics, of names, or of texts of Heidegger--which impairs the book's usefulness. --J. D. C. (shrink)

The author, a professor of psychiatry and religion at Union Theological Seminary in New York, is interested in developing a religious consciousness which is in many ways opposed to that of the existentialists, at least the more anguished existentialists. "Many contemporary Christians appear to be taking the advice of the Apostle Paul to 'work out your salvation with fear and trembling' out of context." And again: "Modern man's nibbling on intellectual fodder and breathing of 'existential' complaints has led him far (...) astray from his true destiny and rendered him a caricature of his true nature." Play is neither deadly serious nor mere fun, but these are the only alternatives of which modern man is aware. Modern man has forgotten the unique character of play and since this belongs to the essence of religion and liturgy, he has forgotten the essence of Christianity. True religion is playful. And the age of leisure has the time to cultivate play if it would set about doing so. In the course of his argument the author surveys the views of Freud, Erikson, Brown, Eliade, Otto, Huizinga, and Callois.--J. D. C. (shrink)

Originally published in 1957 under the title Sunrise to Eternity, this Seabury edition performs the welcome service of presenting again the outstanding English exposition of Boehme's mystico-philosophical thought. The book is extremely sober and scholarly, systematically demythologizing the standard account of Boehme's life and work. Many expositions of Boehme are cluttered with unlikely and distracting accounts of his personal sanctity and numerous revelations. Stoudt, however, gives a tightly argued, well-documented account of Boehme's biography, alternating chapters on Boehme's life with chapters (...) on the works of the same period. This is extremely helpful, for it exhibits Boehme's development quite clearly. Stoudt makes it very plain that Boehme's early thought is couched in the language of alchemy but that it outgrows that strange vocabulary to become by the end of his life a mature spirituality, steeped in the earlier German mystical tradition and with a speculative depth which anticipates the main lines of German idealism. Boehme is not, then, as the standard hagiographers would have him, an unlettered shoemaker, sprung untainted from the breast of God and untaught by any mortal predecessor. Stoudt is not always as clear as we would hope, but, considering Boehme's notorious obscurity he is clearer than most. While Stoudt points out Boehme's origin in the German tradition that precedes him, he underplays the dependence of Boehme on Meister Eckhardt, or at least leaves that whole problem insufficiently analyzed. There is a brief preface by Paul Tillich.--J. D. C. (shrink)

This interesting volume approaches Heidegger in a fresh and suggestive way. The author views Heidegger's thought as a confrontation with the history of metaphysics, an assumption which can hardly be contested. After a preliminary characterization of the essence of "metaphysics" as the later Heidegger understands that word, Laffoucreière reconstructs, chronologically, the history of metaphysics as Heidegger conceives it, studying in turn Heidegger's interpretation of: Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Schelling, Hegel, and Nietzsche. She approaches Heidegger's thought through the eyes (...) of his Nietzsche-interpretation. Heidegger sees the history of the west in profoundly Nietzschean tones: it is the history of nihilism and of the domination of western thought by Christian-Platonic metaphysics whose pivotal concept, God as the first cause, has deteriorated to the point of meaninglessness. The times are needy and it is only by a new turn, a new sending of Being as Mission, that nihilism can be overcome. Laffoucreière explains clearly and forcefully that Heidegger's Seinsdenken is not atheistic, except in the sense of the theos of western metaphysics. She shows that a major concern of Heidegger's thought is to overcome the God of metaphysics in favor of the divine God to whom man can bend his knee. She argues that Heidegger's attempt to retrieve the original sense of Being and man, far from being atheistic, aims in fact at making possible a renewed sense of the living God. The interpretation is sound and for those who doubt it there is a three sentence endorsement of the work by Heidegger himself in which he welcomes the publication of "a clear and pertinent exposition of my thought."--J. D. C. (shrink)

This compact sketch of Fichte's idealism is No. 82 in the PUF series "Initiation philosophique," directed by Jean Lacroix. Bourgeois' book follows the classic division proposed by Gueroult of the genesis of Fichte's thought into three stages: the early philosophy of the ego up to 1800, including the 1794 edition of the Wissenschaftslehre and the celebrated "two introductions" of 1794; the philosophy of Being, 1800-1804, especially The Vocation of Man; and finally the philosophy of the Absolute, 1804 and thereafter, which (...) includes the Fundamental Characteristics of the Present Age and The Way to the Blessed Life. For Bourgeois, these may be just as well characterized, respectively, as the philosophy of moral obligation, of vocation, and of love. He hopes to defend the early Fichte against the charge of "subjective" idealism levelled at him by Schelling and Hegel. He singles out for emphasis the close connection that Fichte makes--Kierkegaard notwithstanding--between life and idealism, and finds this a recurrent characteristic of all of Fichte's works. His interpretation of the first Wissenschaftslehre focusses upon Fichte's remark in the First Introduction that "the kind of philosophy one chooses depends upon the kind of man that one is." This deserves emphasis, anticipating as it does not only the Existentialist interpretation of philosophy but also the Lebensphilosophie of Dilthey. The book is brief and to the point and should prove helpful in the difficult task of unravelling Fichte's thought.--J. D. C. (shrink)

Volume XVIII of the distinguished "Religious Perspectives" series, this translation of Jaspers' 1962 publication Der philosophische Glaube ansichts [[sic]] der Offenbarung is an important addition to the library of English translations of Jaspers' works. It is a lengthy work and, as is typical of Jaspers, is heavily punctuated with textual divisions and subdivisions--a procedure so exaggerated in Jaspers that it is quite distracting. The translation of E. B. Ashton, who has since translated Jaspers' three-volume major work Philosophie, is extremely good, (...) just as one would expect. Jaspers holds that there is an underlying metaphysical structure in being--the Encompassing--which eludes any final conceptual formulation. It can only be approached through "ciphers," symbols which obliquely intimate the nature of the ultimate, and which it belongs to the philosopher to read. While on the one hand Jaspers quarrels with the various religious faiths because of their tendency to take their own ciphers as final and definitive, he is on the other hand profoundly interested in the historical faiths inasmuch as they represent important and deep expressions of faith in the transcendent. In this book Jaspers seeks a rapprochement between "philosophical faith"--an idea which he has ultimately borrowed from Kant's notion of rational faith in the speculatively unknowable thing-in-itself--and the faith that is based on revelation.--J. D. C. (shrink)

While this is the most recent volume to appear in the continuing work of a critical edition of Husserl's collected works, it contains Husserl's first published book, The Philosophy of Arithmetic. This is the famous study in which Husserl--under the influence of J. S. Mill and Brentano--undertook a psychologistic interpretation of the origin and validity of mathematical principles. Under the impulse of Frege's criticism, Husserl came to repudiate this view. Indeed, even without this external impetus, one suspects that the dynamics (...) of Husserl's own thought would have eventually carried him beyond such a view, for his concern even in this first book is to find a "strict" foundation for mathematics, a concern which seems to be clearly at odds with the naturalism and empiricism of the psychologistic theory. The tension between these two--the empirical and the ideal character of mathematical thinking--is reflected in the subtitle of this work: Logical and Psychological Investigations. "Part One" concerns the psychological origin of number: "Part Two" the logical roots. The editor has also included in this volume a set of "Supplementary Texts ". Among these is included the Habilitationsschrift of 1878, The Concept of Number: Psychological Analyses. The rest of this volume is made up of a set of treatises which were to be part of the planned second volume of The Philosophy of Arithmetic, which never appeared. This volume was to be concerned with such topics as the logic of signs, the a priori character of Arithmetic, the imaginary in Arithmetic, and axiomatic systems.--J. D. C. (shrink)

Like his earlier study The Phenomenological Movement, Spiegelberg’s latest work is a comprehensive overview—not of the phenomenological movement itself —but of its influence on psychology and psychiatry. Its aim is to show that the presence of phenomenology in these disciplines has broadened the perspectives of these empirical sciences and has loosened the death-grip that positivism and naturalism, behaviorism and atomistic associationism, might otherwise have exerted upon them, Spiegelberg does this "concretely" by a wide ranging account of philosophers, psychologists and psychiatrists (...) which testifies again to his great erudition and incomparable familiarity with phenomenological literature. The index of authors studied covers six pages of double columns. Part One gives a "general orientation" to the field, discussing first the notion of phenomenological psychology and then the presence of phenomenology in psychology, in psychopathology and psychiatry, in psychoanalysis and in American psychology. The second half of the book is devoted to more concentrated studies of "leading figures" and devotes entire chapters to such thinkers as Jaspers, Binswagner, Minkowski, Buytendijk and Frankl. The American student of phenomenology is once again the beneficiary of Spiegelberg’s conscientious and incisive scholarship the beneficiary of Spiegelberg’s conscientious and incisive scholarship.—J. D. C. (shrink)

One is happy to add this book to the growing list of commentaries on translations of Jaspers’ work which have been appearing in English recently. Samay’s approach to Jaspers underlines one of the most refreshing aspects of this "existentialist’s" work, viz., his concern with the problem of reason, both scientific and philosophic. Like Kant and Husserl, Jaspers’ thought develops out of a confrontation with modern science. Like Kant, Jaspers strives to grant the mathematical sciences the autonomy which befits them but (...) also to show forth their limits. The unique entity to which science has no access Jaspers calls "Existenz," free and individual human being. While this entity eludes science it does not belong to the real of the irrational but to that of philosophic reason. After an introduction to the fundamental concepts of Jaspers’ thought, Samay studies first reason in science and then reason in philosophy, and then offers some "general conclusions." There is a helpful bibliography, abundant documentation but no index.—J. D. C. (shrink)

This is the second edition of a somewhat unusual account of the philosophy of Jaspers. The "Introduction" contains an historical survey of Existentialism which is rather out of date. It associates Heidegger and Sartre together, and as philosophers of the absurd--a mistake for which by now there is no excuse. It sees a "way out of this barren desert" of the philosophy of absurdity in Jaspers--which is a misleadingly religious way to introduce Jaspers. The body of the work contains chapters (...) on the foundations of Jaspers' thought in Kant, on the concept of philosophical faith, a comparison of Jaspers with some contemporaries, such as Whitehead, and a final comparison of Jaspers' "ciphers" with Maimonides' negative theology. The 79-page long text is heavily punctuated with citations and so does not make for smooth reading. This is followed by nearly half that many pages of notes, some of which are rather interesting and which provide the whole with extensive documentation.--J. D. C. (shrink)

One of the scandals of Anglo-American philosophical scholarship is its neglect of the German Idealist tradition. Even in the case of Hegel himself, many important works are either untranslated or have received only inadequate or outdated renderings and suffer from a lack of first-rate, full-length commentaries. The situation is much worse, when one turns to Schelling and Fichte. Lachs and Heath have rendered a real service in providing us with a new translation, available in a well-bound papercover edition, of Fichte's (...) major work, the Wissenschaftslehre of 1794, to supplant the very objectionable Kroeger translation which is, in any case, long since out of print. This is an essential work for comprehending the development of European philosophy in the short but extraordinarily productive period from 1781 to 1807. Along with Schelling's System des transzendentalen Idealismus, Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre constitutes the bridge between Kant's three Critique's and Hegel's Phenomenology. Both of the famous "Introductions" are translated in the current edition. Despite their torturous text, their renderings are clearer than one might expect. There is an extremely helpful introduction by Lachs (who also translated the "First Introduction of 1797," a German-English glossary, and a detailed index. The translators also supply the standard marginal pagination from the Gesamtausgabe of 1834-1846. In all, the work is professionally done, a permanent and much needed contribution of the study of Fichte for English-reading students.--J. D. C. (shrink)

This book attempts to collect Heidegger’s scattered and often very puzzling observations about the holy, divinity, God, and the gods in order to make them a coherent statement. The first three chapters present clearly and soundly the by now familiar material of Heidegger’s attempt, first, to lay the foundation of metaphysics, then, to overcome metaphysics altogether. Chapter 4 draws the conclusion that Heidegger stands in opposition to any metaphysical account of God and that theology, if it is possible at all, (...) must be nonmetaphysical. Chapter 5 argues that Heidegger’s approach to God, centered primarily in the account of the Geviert, is mythical rather than metaphysical, though it does not recommend that we in the twentieth century simply adopt the Homeric or Hesiodic myths. The heart of the book is Chapter 6, in which Perotti analyzes the Hölderlin commentaries. On this basis he claims that, for Heidegger, any word about God’s coming—for we live after the flight of the gods-must come from the poets. Thinking dwells in subordination to poetry, and its role is to cultivate and preserve the poet’s words. On the question of God for Heidegger, according to Perotti, there is nothing to do but wait—for the poets to speak. Perotti’s text is quite brief and, in the opening chapters, covers familiar ground. He makes no use of Phaenomenologie und Theologie. Unfortunately, he often quotes the Lohner translation of the Letter on Humanism, although he always supplies the German. On p. 27, 1934 is mentioned where 1943 is intended. There is ample footnoting, a bibliography, and an index.—J.D.C. (shrink)

Wood's book argues for the integral place of the "moral arguments"--the arguments for freedom, immortality, and the existence of God--in Kant's total philosophical work. These arguments have always been the object of some suspicion not only as regards their internal plausibility but also because it has been maintained that they constitute a surreptitious reintroduction of the speculative way of arguing clearly banned by the first Critique. This suspicion was reinforced by Adickes' edition of the Opus Postumum in which the editor (...) contended that Kant had therein repudiated the moral arguments in favor of a personal experience of God through the Categorical Imperative. Wood's argument to the contrary is vigorous and extremely interesting. He holds that Kant's notion of "rational faith" is a profound religious insight, one whose importance Wood does not hesitate to say is directly proportionate to that of the critical theory itself.--J. D. C. (shrink)

From the translator of The Future of Mankind and The Future of Germany comes this most welcome English rendering of the first volume of Jasper's Philosophie, considered by many his main work. Of all the great figures of the existential-phenomenological movement--Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Marcel--Jaspers has been the most neglected in the Anglo-American world. Jaspers alone among these figures has a work as important as his Philosophie still untranslated into English. This work, which consists of three volumes, was originally (...) published in 1932. The present edition contains: a 1955 Epilogue by Jaspers who comments on the intent of the book and the criticism it received; an "Introduction to Philosophy" which prefaces the body of Philosophy; and then the main body of this title: "Book One: Philosophical World Orientation." Here Jaspers carves out the proper structure of philosophy--not as a science which must compete with other sciences but as thinking concerned with man's place in the world and which regulates the role that science plays in man's world. There is, unfortunately, no index nor any glossary of German-English and English-German.--J. D. C. (shrink)

This volume is No. 86 in a series entitled "Initiation philosophique," directed by Jean Lacroix. Henriot takes issue with those who, on the one hand, hold that all is play and with those who, on the other hand, hold that because everything is determined, there is nothing arbitrary or undetermined, and consequently there is no play at all. The author's argument occurs in three stages: the structure of play as an objective fact ; the act of playing itself ; that (...) which makes play to be play. This last element the author identifies as the "intersubjective" or "existential." This constitutes the three parts of the book: I. Games; II. Playing; III. The Player.--J. D. C. (shrink)

The slippery slope argument has been the mainstay of many of those opposed to the legalisation of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia. In this paper I re-examine the slippery slope in the light of two recent studies that examined the prevalence of medical decisions concerning the end of life in the Netherlands and in Australia. I argue that these two studies have robbed the slippery slope of the source of its power--its intuitive obviousness. Finally I propose that, contrary to the warnings (...) of the slippery slope, the available evidence suggests that the legalisation of physician-assisted suicide might actually decrease the prevalence of non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. (shrink)

Heidegger's Unterwegs zur Sprache is one of his most important books and this English translation is a timely addition to the English edition of his "Works." No other single topic is of more interest to the current commentators on Heidegger than that of language. There is a growing sense of a kinship between Heidegger and Wittgenstein and an increasing number of efforts to link continental and Anglo-American thought more closely together--all of which should be stimulated by the appearance of this (...) translation. The work is also interesting from another perspective. The central document in the attempt to relate Heidegger to the East is found in this work in the opening dialogue between Heidegger and Professor Tezuka of the Imperial University of Tokyo about the nature of the experience of language in the East and in Western "metaphysical" Europe. The other essays, particularly "The Way to Language," offer an excellent presentation of the later Heidegger's general view of language. Original language itself, according to Heidegger, is Being and it is this which stirs man into speaking. Human utterance is the revelation or expression of Being rather than, as in the traditional view, a representation or "picture" of "objects" symbolized by sounds or words. If man is "open" to Being then Being will find in language its "house"--implying thereby that the dimensions of the house are the limits of the revealability [[sic]] of Being. Human utterance is "closed off" from "original language" insofar as "Logos" is reduced to "logistics," that is, insofar as all other talk than the mathematico-logical talk of the age of Technik is dismissed as belonging to "unreason." The translation itself is well-done. The Editors of the "Works," in consultation with Heidegger, have chosen to omit the first essay in the 1959 German original in order to publish it in another volume yet to appear. The translators have supplied us with no index, only a few footnotes, explaining their decisions, no "Introduction," no bibliography--all of which can only be regretted.--J. D. C. (shrink)